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From 2000 to 2007, Estonia was one of the fastest growing emerging market economies. A housing 
boom, fuelled by capital inflows and credit, resulted in skyrocketing house prices and an over-expanded 
construction sector. However, the currency board limited the Bank of Estonia’s ability to curb credit 
growth, while the fiscal policy framework amplified the cycle through pro-cyclical spending increases 
and tax cuts. As credit was mostly financed by cross-border loans from foreign banks, the risks of 
disruptions to credit flows and financial contagion have increased. Some have already materialised 
through tightened lending standards and capital outflows.  
Estonia is now in a severe recession. To restore high and sustainable growth, the country will need 
to rebalance its resources from non-tradables towards exports. Regaining external competitiveness will 
be challenging, however, given the fixed exchange rate and recent devaluations in partner countries. 
Flexibility of the economy will thus be crucial. Over the medium term, policymakers could also 
strengthen incentives for a better functioning of the housing finance market and gradually remove the 
pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy.  
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I.   Introduction 
From 2000 to 2007, Estonia experienced exceptional real GDP growth rates (Figure 1a). The 
country converged rapidly to the income levels of the euro area, with living standards exceeding 
those in most new members of the European Union.  
However, growth was unbalanced and driven by an overexpansion of non-tradable sectors, 
particularly real estate and construction. It was financed by large capital inflows, which led to 
unsustainable current account deficits and high private debt. External financing became a key 
source of rapid credit growth, mainly to households for real estate purchases in the form of 
variable interest rate and foreign currency loans. Pro-cyclical fiscal policy and wages amplified 
the cycle.  
In addition to the liquidity risk, the predominance of cross-border loans from the Nordic 
banks has exposed Estonian banking sector to foreign exchange and contagion risks. Since the 
Estonian banks have financed most of the long-term mortgage loans by short-term borrowings in 
euros from their parent banks, maturity mismatch also became a concern.  
Growth came to an abrupt halt starting at end-2007, when some of these risks materialized. 
Specifically, the Nordic lenders reassessed risks related to the Estonian economy’s prospects and 
high private sector indebtedness, and tightened lending conditions. This trend, which was 
amplified by rapidly declining domestic demand and plummeting consumer confidence, resulted 
also in lower demand for credit. To exacerbate this downward trend in economic growth, exports 
were hit by the collapse of demand for imports among the main trading partners at end-2008.  
Being now in a severe recession, Estonia is facing its most challenging situation since the 
early  1990s. Restoring high and a sustainable growth will require regaining external 
competitiveness, which will be challenging given the exchange rate regime and recent 
devaluations in partner countries. Increasing flexibility of the economy is thus crucial. In addition, 
the pro-cyclical fiscal policy should gradually evolve into a rule-based countercyclical one. Policy 
makers could also phase out distortions in the housing finance market that amplified the cycle. 
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Figure 1a. Estonia and emerging market economies: GDP growth and inflation 
Average annual % change, 2000-07 
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Figure 1b. Real GDP, domestic demand and private sector credit 
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Source: Bank of Estonia; OECD Economic Outlook database; IMF WEO database. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the current economic challenges; 
Section  III provides an overview of the trends and drivers of capital inflows; Section  IV 
summarizes the household debt accumulation and its implications; Section V discusses options for 
developing housing finance market; and Section VI concludes.   
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II.   Estonia’s boom turned into bust 
During the period between 2000 and 2007, Estonia’s output grew faster than in most 
emerging market economies. Between 2005 and 2007, however, the real GDP growth accelerated 
even more rapidly and signs of overheating appeared: GDP grew above its trend, labour shortages 
emerged, inflation rose, and current account deficits surged to unsustainable levels. 
Growth collapsed in 2008 and is projected to regain strength only in 2011 
Since 2008, the economy has been experiencing a hard landing, largely unwinding a loan-
financed over-expansion of domestic demand. Real GDP contracted by 3.6% in 2008 compared 
to  2007, due to a collapse of domestic demand and a slowdown of foreign-financed credit 
(Figure 1b). Exports were also hit at the end of 2008 due to the economic slowdown in the euro 
area. Growth is projected to pick up gradually in 2010 and regain strength only in 2011 (OECD, 
2009a).  
The ongoing recession was triggered by a combination of declining real estate prices and a 
tightening of credit. Even though the current account imbalances of preceding years called for a 
correction, the speed and size of the output adjustment were faster and deeper than expected. The 
slowdown has brought about a deterioration of the fiscal balance, which in 2008 resulted in the 
first significant budget deficit since the Russian crisis in 1998. Unemployment has increased 
rapidly, putting an end to years of steady decline. On the positive side, the current account deficit 
has narrowed, and the annual (year-on-year) CPI inflation has decelerated. 
During the boom, output and employment shifted disproportionately to the non-tradable 
sectors and led to external imbalances that have narrowed somewhat only recently. To restore 
growth, Estonia will need to shift production from non-tradables (such as construction and 
housing) to export sectors. Competitiveness thus will need to be restored, including through 
enhancing flexibility of labour and product markets.
2 However, the inherited real exchange rate 
appreciation of the Estonian kroon and devaluation in partner countries will make the necessary 
export-driven recovery more challenging. The speed of recovery will depend on how quickly the 
main trading partners, especially the euro area, will rebound from recession.
3 
External vulnerabilities remain, but there are mitigating factors 
Estonia’s domestic financial system is dominated by commercial banks. In fact, the entire 
banking sector is privately owned, of which the majority is foreign-owned. The market 
concentration is high, with the four largest banks (Swedbank, SEB, Sampo, and Nordea, all 
foreign-owned) accounting for more than 95% of the financial market, as measured by total assets 
at end-2007. 
                                                 
2.  Chapters 4 and 5 in OECD (2009a) discuss measures to increase labour and product market flexibility in 
Estonia.  
3.  Reinhardt and Rogoff (2008) examine past banking crises in OECD countries and find that they often 
follow housing booms. GDP growth remains weak several years after the crisis, which could complicate 
the global recovery.     
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While financial integration has brought the Estonian economy significant benefits, it has also 
raised concerns about contagion risks from international financial markets. The strong presence of 
foreign - mostly Nordic - banks has increased Estonia’s dependence on cross-border credit and 
vulnerability to its reversals due to changes in parent banks’ risk assessment. The global crisis has 
already affected the Estonian banking sector and the economy through tighter lending standards.  
The liquidity risk of the banking sector materialised in the fall of 2008 with a run on one of 
the major Nordic banks, but the situation stabilized due to swift action of the home country central 
bank (IMF, 2009). In February 2009, the Bank of Estonia signed a precautionary agreement with 
the Swedish Central Bank that guarantees its access to extra liquidity, if needed. The agreement 
thus reduces the liquidity risk by strengthening the Bank of Estonia’s capability to add funding to 
the banking sector. One of the remaining risks is then whether the Nordic banks would be able to 
provide sufficient financing. 
The predominance of variable-rate loans in foreign currency is adding to financial 
vulnerabilities, which is already high due to rising unemployment and declining real estate prices 
(Table  1). The relatively high stock of short-term external debt has also been of concern.
4 
However, in addition to the precautionary agreement with the Riksbank, the liquidity risk has 
been reduced by the rapidly narrowing current account deficit, which is increasingly financed by 
the EU structural funds.
5  
 
Table 1. Macroeconomic and financial indicators in selected emerging market economies 
 
Foreign bank 
credit (% of host 
GDP) 
Current account balance  
(% of GDP) 
Private-sector 
credit  Inflation 
 End-2007  2007  2008 
1 Year-on-year,  2008 
2 
Estonia  161.7 -18.1  -10.8  21.5  11.1 
Bulgaria  90.4 -21.4  -24.4  54.5  14.5 
Hungary  87.0 -5.0  -5.5 18.0  6.7 
Latvia  125.5 -22.9  -15.1  22.2  16.7 
Lithuania  92.4 -14.6  -14.9  36.4  12.2 
Poland  51.1 -3.8  -4.7 29.5  4.8 
Romania  50.6 -14.0  -13.8  62.0  9.0 
.  
1.  Estimates, IMF WEO database, October 2008.  
2.  Latest available observation in 2008.  
Source: IMF (2008). 
                                                 
4       According to the Bank of Estonia, the external debt was 125 % of GDP, with the short term debt           
      accounting for 50% of GDP at end-2008.  
5.  In response to the global financial crisis, Estonia raised the deposit insurance limit from 20  000 to 
50 000 euros in October 2008 to increase confidence in the banking sector.   
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III.    Capital inflows and the credit boom during 2000-07: drivers and consequences 
Large capital inflows fuelled growth but led to external imbalances and loss of competitiveness 
The growth acceleration between 2000 and 2007 was driven mostly by domestic demand, and 
especially by a private investment boom (Table 2). Since 2003, the bulk of investment took place 
in the non-tradable sector, in particular in the residential housing and the construction sector. In 
contrast to the central European countries where growth was driven more by exports, in Estonia 
and the other two Baltic countries (i.e. countries with fixed exchange rate regimes), domestic 
demand and investment growth outpaced real GDP growth by wide margins. However, the 
concentration in construction and dwellings indicates that investment in these countries has not 
directly raised productivity, export capacity, or competitiveness.
6  
Table 2. Sources of domestic demand changes during 2000-07 
Percentage points of GDP 
  
Investment/GDP Consumption/GDP 
  
Domestic 
demand/GDP 
Total  Dwelling, res. 
construction  Total Private Public 
Estonia    6.6   9.3   9.8  -2.6   0.1  -2.6 
Latvia   11.7  12.1   6.1  -0.5   2.5  -3.0 
Lithuania    7.1  11.5   8.2  -4.6   0.0  -4.5 
Czech R.  -8.1  -2.9   0.5 -5.1  -4.4  -0.7 
Hungary   -5.1  -6.8   n/a   1.6   1.5   0.2 
Poland   -3.7  -1.1  -0.6  -2.7  -3.2   0.6 
Slovak R.
1/ -1.3    1.7   0.6 -2.9  -0.2  -2.8 
1.   Dwellings and other buildings. 
Source: Ameco statistical database (2008). 
The investment boom was financed by capital inflows, which reflected a benign international 
environment combined with Estonia’s liberalised capital account and the currency board. As 
foreign banks under-priced risks due to their overly-optimistic assessment of Estonia’s growth 
prospects, the inflows led to unsustainable current account deficits. In fact, starting from already 
high deficit in the 1990s, Estonia’s current account balance deteriorated faster than those of most 
emerging market countries (Figure 2a). 
The widening current account deficit has been financed increasingly by loans. As a 
consequence, the stock of private external debt rose above 100% of GDP at the end of 2007. The 
debt built up has worsened Estonia’s net international investment position relative to Central 
European countries, with the exception of Hungary (Figure 2b). In addition, the capital inflows 
led to inflationary pressures, real exchange appreciation and erosion of competitiveness, and 
pressures on the fixed exchange rate regime (Hegerty, 2009).  
                                                 
6.  Lamine (2008) carried out a sectoral breakdown of the real value added and TFP growth during 2005-07 
and found that manufacturing and financial intermediation registered high total factor productivity growth, 
while productivity growth in construction and real estate declined.     
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Figure 2a. Current account deficits in emerging market economies 
% of GDP 
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Figure 2b. Net international investment positions: Estonia and Central Europe, 2001-06 
(Per cent of GDP) 
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Source: IMF IFS database (May 2009).    
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… and were mirrored in the credit boom  
Private-sector credit surged between 2000 and 2007, starting from a low base even relative to 
most other European emerging market economies (Figure 3a). The currency board locked in low 
real interest rates, but also other factors such as income growth and general optimism due to EU 
accession contributed. The significant credit market liberalization and financial integration are 
often mentioned as additional factors that fueled credit booms but also the high GDP growth.
7  
By end of 2007, the share of private sector credit in GDP in Estonia was one of the highest 
among the European emerging market economies. As liabilities of banks and foreign branches 
operating in Estonia increasingly consisted of parent banks’ loans rather than domestic deposits, 
the banks’ net foreign asset positions deteriorated and loan-to-deposits ratios increased (Table 3). 
These developments in the banking sector raised concerns about the quality of the loan portfolio 
and its financing, and especially raised fears about Estonia’s vulnerability to reversals in credit 
due to changes in Nordic banks’ risk assessment. The global financial crisis has affected the 
Estonian banking sector through higher cost of borrowing, tighter lending standards, and reduced 
foreign credit. 
Table 3. Financing of the credit growth, 2000-07  
(Changes in the ratios, in percentage points of GDP) 
  2000-04 2005-07 
Bank credit to the private sector  5.9  11.0 
Bank credit to the public sector  0.1  -0.2 
Net foreign liabilities  -0.3  8.4 
Bank deposits  1.9  3.9 
Other net liabilities  4.4  -1.5 
Source: Bank of Estonia.  
Searching for profits, Nordic banks took increased risks, probably due to the fact that their 
exposure in Estonia was a small part of their total portfolios. Accordingly, they set nominal 
interest rates at the same levels as in their home markets. With a rise in local inflation, real interest 
rates turned negative for Estonian borrowers and demand for credit increased. However, the high 
risk tolerance of the Nordic banks has reflected an underestimation of the risks pertaining to the 
Estonian economy and relied on overly optimistic growth expectations. The banks also most 
likely overestimated the liquidity or collateral value involved in higher-risk loans. 
The rapid credit growth was also encouraged by improved scores from some credit rating 
agencies between 2001 and 2007. Responses of the credit agencies to the downturn seem more 
measured as only one downgraded Estonia more than the economic fundamentals seem to justify. 
                                                 
7    Tornell and Westermann (2005) illustrate that in the middle-income countries with credit market 
imperfections, including limited contract enforceability, financial liberalization leads to more rapid growth. 
However, this higher growth is not smooth, but takes place through booms and busts.     
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In general, research on cyclical properties of credits ratings in emerging market countries points to 
their procyclicality.
8  
Household credit expanded particularly rapidly, especially between 2004 and 2007, and the 
sectoral composition of total credit shifted to mortgages and real estate.
9 As a result, real estate 
prices skyrocketed (below), making Estonia vulnerable to a sharp correction in the real estate 
market, which has materialized. About 80% of all domestic loans were extended in foreign 
currency and funded by short term euro loans from parent banks, raising liquidity risk. The 
currency mismatch in the households (and corporate) balance sheets, together with the low level 
of international reserves, has made local borrowers subject to exchange rate risk.
10 This risk 
underscores the importance of maintaining the currency board at the prevailing rate.  
Throughout this period, Estonia faced challenges in cross-border coordination of banking 
supervision with the Nordic counterparts. It has been recognized that the mostly nationally-based 
supervisory systems and safety nets often do not capture negative externalities involved in cross-
border supervision. Coordination and enhanced information sharing between the host and home 
country supervisory institutions are hence required for effective supervision and regulation 
(Gulde, 2005; Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, 2006; Eisenbeis, 2006; and OECD, 2009b). Towards 
this goal, the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority signed agreements –  in the form of 
Memoranda of Understanding - with foreign supervisory bodies in the Nordic countries.
11  
The currency board arrangement, in place since 1992, contributed to the credit growth. While 
the arrangement has served Estonia well over the years, especially as a guarantee of commitment 
to prudent macroeconomic policies during transition, it constrained the Bank of Estonia’s ability 
to curtail credit growth. Measures which the Bank adopted, such as an increase in the minimum 
reserve requirement ratio, were mostly of a signaling nature and had minimal actual impact.
12 
Lending conditions and bank lending in Estonia were highly pro-cyclical in recent years 
(Figure 3b). 
                                                 
8.  For example, Ferri et al. (1999) found pro-cyclical behavior of the rating agencies during the Asian crisis, 
while Kaminsky et al. (2004) found that ratings tend to be pro-cyclical for the middle-income countries in 
general. Regarding procyclicality of credit ratings in the United States, utilizing annual data on all US 
firms rated by Standard & Poor’s, Amato and Furfine (2004) found no evidence that ratings would exhibit 
excess sensitivity to the business cycle. More recently, however, Pagano and Volpin (2009) argue that 
rating inflation contributed to the boom and bust of the market for the asset-backed securities.  
9.  At the end of 2007, mortgages accounted for 40% of total credit to the private sector and real estate related 
business activities for another 25% (IMF, 2009). 
10.  However, the foreign exchange and liquidity risks are mitigated by the fact that most of the exposure of the 
Estonian banks is to Nordic parent banks, shifting the liquidity risk to contagion should the parent 
institutions themselves experience major funding difficulties on international markets (IMF, 2009; and 
Ross, 2009). In addition, foreign banks replaced an exchange rate risk with a credit risk.  
11.  The recent IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program and Update concluded that there are no serious 
weaknesses in Estonian bank supervision and regulation (IMF, 2009). 
12.  The additional reserves created now provide an extra buffer and strengthen the financial sector. Together 
with the minimal public debt, they distinguish Estonia from Latvia and Lithuania.   
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Figure 3a. Private sector credit growth in emerging market economies, 2001-07 
(Change in credit-to-GDP ratio) 
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Figure 3b. Correlations of the cyclical components of real interest rates and real GDP
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1.  The cyclical component is obtained from HP-filtered data for 1995-2007 from the Eurostat and the IMF IFS.  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, IFS, and the Bank of Estonia.    
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…and were also reflected in skyrocketing house prices 
House price increases in Tallinn between 1997 and mid-2007 were striking - prices rose by 
500% in nominal terms. Such increases seem comparable to (or even above) countries that 
experienced major house booms such as Ireland or the UK.
 13 Specifically, nominal house prices in 
Ireland increased by 340% between 1992 and 2006 and in the UK by 200% between 1998 
and 2007.  
House prices in Estonia increased particularly rapidly between 2004 and 2006, growing faster 
than in most OECD countries, the Nordic neighbours, and regional peers such as Slovenia 
(Table 4). Similar to the UK and Ireland, the decline of house prices from their peaks was also 
abrupt in Estonia, amounting to more than a 30 percent decrease between mid-2007 and the 
4th quarter of 2008.  
Table 4. Real house price changes and some of the underlying factors, 2004-06
1  
  
Real house 
prices
2 
Real GDP growth, 
2002-06
2 
Real mortgage 
rates
3 
Housing loans to 
GDP
4 
Estonia 23.0  8.4  0.1  16.8 
Slovenia 10.3  4.2  3.6  3.6 
Finland 6.1  3.0  2.6  5.8 
Ireland 9.2  5.5  1.5  13.3 
Spain 10.2  3.3  0.3  15.8 
Sweden 9.0  3.2  1.9  5.9 
1.  Based on the European Central Bank (2003), Table 2.4. 
2.   Average annual growth rates, in %. For Estonia, only Tallinn prices were used.  
3   Average over the period, in percent. 
4.   Cumulative change in percentage points.  
Source: ECB; Hypostat, 2008. 
Drivers of house prices in Estonia 
Utilizing an empirical model, the sections below analyze factors underlying Estonia’s house 
price increases between 1997 and 2007, to determine whether they were similar to other countries 
that have experienced housing booms. The results also shed light on causes of the recent sharp 
decline. In the UK, the growth of house prices was due to population growth, rising incomes, and 
low interest rates, and amplified by the loosening of mortgage credit conditions (Kuenzel and 
Bjornbak, 2008). In Ireland, favourable tax treatment of residential property was also an important 
driver of house price inflation (Malzubris, 2008).  
The econometric analysis is based on a standard framework where house prices are 
determined by housing supply and demand in the long run, as in Meen (2002), Jacobsen and Naug 
(2005) and others. Demand is captured by households’ real disposable income and the housing 
cost per representative house owner. Supply, which is relatively stable in the short run, is 
measured by the available housing stock per person. Households’ income and housing stock per 
person were rising during most of the years between 1997 and 2007, while interest rates were 
decreasing.  
                                                 
13.  Even though Estonia wide prices are not available, Tallinn price increases give some indication.   
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More formally, in the underlying theoretical framework house prices are determined by 
housing supply and demand in the long run. The housing demand function described by  (1) 
and (2):
  
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛ = Y
P
V
f H
D , , where  0 , 0 2 1 > < f f                 ( 1 )  
where 
D H is housing demand, V total housing cost for a representative house owner, P  
index of prices of goods and services other then housing, and Y households’ real disposable 
income.
14 The housing cost for an owner-occupier is the value of goods foregone because of 
owning and occupying a dwelling: 
[] π τ − − = = ) 1 ( i
P
PH
BK
P
PH
P
V
                    ( 2 )  
where PH is the nominal price of an average dwelling, BK is the user cost (real after tax 
housing loan interest rate), i is the nominal interest rate, τ  is the income tax rate, and π  is the 
inflation rate. The housing supply, denoted H, is stable in the short run. PH equates housing 
demand and supply.  
Empirical estimation of the above framework is carried out using the time series of quarterly 
data on house price and housing loan interest rate deflated by consumer prices from mid-1997 to 
early 2008. The quarterly dwelling stock series were obtained by extrapolating of data on 
completed dwellings. All variables except the interest rate are in logarithms.
15 An error correction 
model, capturing the long-run determinants of house prices and short-run dynamics, is utilized. 
The focus is on the long-run results as this allows for the analysis of main factors driving house 
prices over the medium term.
16  
Table 5 summarises the main results.
17 It shows that, indeed, house prices over the long run 
are explained mainly by increased household income and very low real after tax interest rates 
whereas the lack of housing supply does not seem to have been a major factor determining house 
price growth. This can be partly explained by the slow response in the total available housing 
dwellings to price changes, consistently with evidence for OECD countries (OECD, 2008 and 
2006, and others).  
                                                 
14.  This section draws on Meen (2002), Jacobsen and Naug (2005), and Égert and Mihaljek (2007). Demand 
for housing rises with income and decreases with housing cost.  
15.  Standard unit root test indicate that all the variables are non-stationary, i.e. there may exist a co-integration 
relationship between them.  
16.  The error correction model is estimated using: i)  Engle-Granger two-steps approach; ii) the  two-step 
approach with dynamic OLS; and iii)  estimating an error correction model using the auto-regressive 
distributed lag (ARDL).  
17.  The error correction term is negative in all the estimations showing that differences between actual and the 
long-run house prices based on key are corrected over time. The adjustment of actual house price to their 
long-run level is relatively rapid in the Estonian housing markets, i.e. the error correction term is large.    
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Table 5. Results for house price regressions 
OLS DOLS ARDL
real disposable income 1.76*** 2.10*** 2.00**
(3.5) (3.3) (2.1) 
real after-tax mortgage rate  -2.84***  -2.24**  -2.31*
(-2.9) (-2.2) (-1.8)
housing stock per person 0.01 -3.02 -1.81
(0.0) (-0.4) (-0.2)
ECT  -0.83***  -0.66***  -0.85***
(-5.7) (-4.3) (-4.5)
No. obs. 40 40 40
adjR2 0.48 0.34 0.42  
The response of house prices to income changes is fairly high. The estimated income 
elasticity is around two, i.e. a 1% increase in income leads to around a 2% rise in prices. This is 
somewhat higher than recent OECD estimates for Ireland and Sweden -  two small open 
economies that have also experienced a housing boom. The effect of a one percentage point 
increase in the after-tax interest rate is estimated to vary between 2 to 3% which is close to OECD 
estimates for Ireland, and Netherlands (OECD, 2006; 2007; and 2008). 
As Table 5 shows, households’ real disposable income and real after-tax interest rate have the 
expected signs and are statistically significant, but the housing stock is not statistically significant 
in any of the specifications.
18 The results are robust to change in the estimation method. All 
estimations include constant and seasonal dummies. 
To check the robustness of the results, several different specifications were estimated. 
Specifically, to capture the impact of potential first-time buyers, the population for the 25 to 29 
age group was considered and the housing stock was divided by the number of persons in this age 
group (OECD, 2006a; OECD 2006b; and OECD, 2009b). The quarterly population series for the 
age group 25-29 were derived by linear extrapolation and using quarterly data on age groups in 
EuroStat Labour Force Survey. In addition, real wages were considered instead of real disposable 
income. Finally, the effect of differences in the period of analysis was examined. The results are 
relatively robust to these changes in the baseline specifications. 
In sum, house prices in Estonia have been driven by: i) rapidly rising disposable incomes 
related to steep GDP and wage growth, declining tax rates; and ii) a fall in after-tax interest rates 
during the first half of the decade.
19 Overly optimistic expectations about future house price rises 
are not explicitly captured in the above analysis, but inevitably played a role during the upturn, 
while negative perceptions have exacerbated the downturn.
20  
                                                 
18.  Excluding the housing stock as a regressor does not change the results pertaining to the households’ 
income and after-tax interest rate.  
19.  It is common to assess to what extent these increases were driven by underlying fundamentals (interest 
rates, income) and to what extent houses were overvalued. From late 2005 until early 2007 the actual house 
prices were estimated to be above their fundamentals by 5 to 10%. The gap between the actual prices and 
fundamentals is smaller than is estimated for other countries, for example in IMF (2008), pointing to 
uncertainties surrounding such estimates. In Estonia the fundamentals themselves have been distorted due 
to imperfections in credit and labour markets.  
20.  For discussion of how expectations of price increases lead to actual increase in house prices that are not 
related to fundamentals, see White (2006) and Jacobsen (2005).  
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Procyclical wages amplified the business cycle… 
In addition to lending conditions, Estonia’s policymakers faced pro-cyclical wage growth. 
Rapid credit and wage growth of recent years stimulated domestic demand, and was reflected in 
the pro-cyclical private consumption and output volatility. Output and private consumption in 
Estonia were more volatile (measured by relative standard deviation) than, on average, output and 
private consumption in other European emerging market economies (Table 6). 
Table 6. Business cycle properties of wages, credit and private consumption, 1995 - 2007 
Relative standard deviation 
(in % of the mean)  Correlations with output 
Country 
Output Private  consumption  Wage 
growth
1 
Private 
consumption 
Private sector 
credit 
Czech Republic  13.5  12.2  0.12  0.78  0.84 
Estonia 30.6  27.9 0.52  0.95  0.92 
Hungary 17.9  17.9  -0.20  0.73  0.59 
1/ Correlation of real wage growth with the Eurostat’s output gap. Source: Authors’ calculations.  
…and so did procyclical fiscal policies 
With the currency board and a liberalized capital account, fiscal policy is the only remaining 
tool of macroeconomic management. However, instead of mitigating the cycle, fiscal policy 
amplified it.  
Since the early 1990s, when the currency board was introduced, the government adhered to 
the rule of annually balanced budgets. While the fiscal discipline contributed to Estonia having a 
stronger fiscal position than most OECD and European emerging market countries (Figures 4a 
and 4b), such rules have been criticized for increasing output volatility and creating pro-cyclical 
bias (Fatas, 2005; and European Commission, 2006). Indeed, estimates of the Estonian cyclically 
adjusted budget balance suggest that fiscal stance has been pro-cyclical or neutral every year 
since 2000 (European Commission, 2008).
21  
An alternative way to evaluate the fiscal cyclical stance is through changes in government 
consumption and tax rates (Kaminsky et al., 2004).
 According to this approach, tax policy has 
been pro-cyclical in recent years, as tax rates on both personal and corporate income were 
gradually lowered from 2004 onwards, while the other rates remained unchanged.
22 The cyclical 
component of real government consumption was positively correlated with the cyclical 
component of real GDP between 1995 and 2007, suggesting that expenditures amplified 
procyclical lending conditions and wages (Figure 4c).
23  
                                                 
21.  The estimates are based on the output gap and do not classify revenues associated with the absorption 
boom as cyclical. They underestimate the fiscal loosening of recent years (Jaeger and Klemm, 2007). 
22.  The pro-cyclical stance continued in 2009 with the postponed cut of personal and corporate income tax 
rate, while the reduced VAT rate on selected items increased. 
23. Kaminsky  et al. (2004) found that in the emerging market countries spells of capital inflows are associated 
with expansionary macroeconomic policies while outflows with contractionary ones.    
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IV.   Reassessment of the household debt sustainability put a break on the housing boom 
Shocks to asset prices alter the value of collateral and hamper borrowers’ ability to borrow, 
thus amplifying credit cycles (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). With high indebtedness, Estonian 
households are particularly vulnerable to tighter lending conditions, especially in combination 
with income and house price declines (ECB, 2003). This section discusses the causes and 
characteristics of high household debt in Estonia, its macroeconomic implications, and mitigating 
factors.  
Figure 4a. Fiscal balance, 2003-07 
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Figure 4b. Gross debt, 2003-07 
% of GDP 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Average
EST LVA ROU LTU SVN CZE BGR SVK POL HUN
  
 
 
 
16
 
Figure 4c. Correlations of the cyclical components of real government consumption and real GDP 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and IFS. 
Household indebtedness has soared due to a variety of factors 
Household debt grew rapidly during the 2000s, as illustrated by high ratio of housing loans to 
GDP at the end of 2007 (Figure 5). Between 2004 and 2007, the increase in the stock of housing 
loans amounted to 20 percentage points of GDP, and household debt jumped up during this period 
by about 25 percentage points of GDP. The Estonian corporate sector is also heavily indebted, 
implying that through their shareholdings in enterprises, households ultimately bear many risks 
associated with the deteriorating corporate sector.
24 
Debt accumulation was the flip side of financial sector reforms and opening the banking 
sector to foreign investors. Privatization in the mid-1990s put a large majority of the housing 
stock into private ownership, forming the collateral base for mortgage finance in Estonia (OECD, 
2005). 
Household borrowing expanded after the Russian crisis when Nordic banks acquired the key 
domestic banks. Households’ optimistic expectations about future incomes, low mortgage rates, 
favourable tax treatment of interest, and low inflation also played a role (Table 7). New products, 
in particular those allowing equity withdrawal, added to debt by letting borrowers repay their 
mortgages slowly. The causes of rising household debt were thus similar to those in OECD 
                                                 
24.  The high corporate and household debt separates Estonia from the euro area countries, where household 
savings increased during the credit expansion and offset the corporate financial deficit (IMF, 2008).    
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countries - favourable financial conditions, buoyant housing markets, and supply side innovations 
in credit markets (Girouard, Kennedy and André, 2006). 
The high debt burden has weakened households’ financial position. By mid-2008, household 
loans amounted to almost 100% of their financial assets, markedly above regional peers such as 
the Czech Republic. While borrowing has slowed in 2008 and 2009, the value of financial assets 
also declined due to plummeting equity prices and a slowdown in deposit growth, resulting in 
negative net financial worth.
25  
Figure 5. Housing loans, 2007  
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Note: Data for 2008 refers to June and for other years, to December.  
Table 7. Household debt, December 2002-September 2008 
   Dec-02  Dec-03  Dec-04  Dec-05  Dec-06  Dec-07  Sep-08 
As percent of 
disposable income  25.7  33.1  41.6  56.2  75.7  86.1  84.3 
As percent of GDP  13.7  17.7  21.4  30.6  40.9  46.8  48.9 
Source: Bank of Estonia. 
Macroeconomic implications of high household debt 
The high level of household indebtedness in Estonia has several macroeconomic 
implications, including a greater sensitivity of private consumption and GDP growth to changes in 
interest rates. While to some extent high household borrowing constituted a rational response to 
favourable lending conditions and consumption smoothing, the level of households’ indebtedness 
in Estonia at the end of 2007 far exceeded that of regional peers with similar per capita income, 
such as the Czech Republic (Table 8). Experiences of other countries suggest that high household 
indebtedness is unlikely to be a source of a major negative shock to the other sectors of the 
economy, but it may amplify other shocks, such as fluctuations in income, interest rates and house 
prices. With variable interest rates, consumption responds quickly to price shocks (Debelle, 2004).  
                                                 
25   For households that purchased their houses in the early 2000s, this was somewhat mitigated by rising net 
non-financial assets.  
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Table 8. Estonia and the Czech Republic: Selected indicators of household indebtedness, end-2007 
 Estonia  Czech  Republic 
Debt/GDP (%)  45.0  23.4 
Debt / financial assets (%)  95.0  29.6 
Interest expenses / disposable income (%) 
1/ 4.8  1.8 
Deposits/debt (%)  44.5  216 
Net financial assets/GDP (%)  0.7  41.1 
1.  Gross disposable income is used for the Czech Republic; net disposable income for Estonia.  
Source: The Bank of Estonia and the Czech National Bank. 
Several factors mitigate risks stemming from the high household indebtedness. The 
distribution of the debt is skewed towards households with high incomes, who are less exposed to 
rises in unemployment or interest rates.
26 As the maturity of housing loans lengthened, households 
can maintain same monthly debt service payments while taking out larger loans.  
However, the average loan to value (LTV) ratio increased to 90% for some of the new 
housing loans extended in recent years. As the house prices continue to fall, some of the newer 
borrowers are likely to end up with negative equity. The Bank of Estonia and Financial 
Supervisory Authority should therefore carefully monitor the latest developments in various 
aggregate indicators of indebtedness, including LTV ratios and ratios of debt to disposable 
income, and communicate findings to the banking sector and the public. This would increase 
transparency and also help maintain trust in the financial stability of the banking system. 
Financial stability risks related to variable interest rates 
In the current environment of high mortgage debt and the predominantly variable-rate loans, 
the sensitivity of households to interest rate changes implies a greater default risks and an 
increased vulnerability of the financial sector. Even if households would not default on loans, an 
interest rate increase reduces their disposable income, thus affecting overall economic activity. 
Through volatility of debt service payments, the variable-rate loans make the household 
sector directly, and the banking sector indirectly, vulnerable to interest rate changes.
27 The 
households bear directly the risk of higher interest rates through larger mortgage payments and 
smaller net income. The ability of households to maintain debt service payments when interest 
rate increases depends largely on whether the households anticipated such changes at the time 
when they applied for the mortgages (Debelle, 2004). As the output decline and unemployment 
increase are much more pronounced than expected, some payment difficulties are inevitable.  
Banks’ credit risk rises with the increased use of variable rate loans as banks replace their 
interest rate risk by higher client default risk. In contrast to variable rates, fixed rates give 
                                                 
26.  More recently, the extension of maturities to more than 20 years and reductions in minimum down 
payment requirements made housing loans accessible to lower income households. Correspondingly, 
households that took out a loan in recent years seem to be the most vulnerable to adverse shocks.  
27.  Specifically, a one percentage point rise in short-term interest rates would lead to a 0.8 percentage point 
increase in the aggregate interest payment-to-disposable income ratio.    
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households certainty over the profile of their debt service payments.
28 However, since the 
fixed-rate loans entail an interest rate risk for the lender, a premium is required and these loans 
often ex post turn out to be more expensive.  
The current recession has increased risks to financial stability, mainly through rising 
unemployment and deterioration of disposable income, but also through interest rate increases. To 
the extent that the house purchases were speculative and households were counting on house price 
increases for repaying their primary mortgages, the decline in real estate prices will undermine 
their debt service capacity. However, the share of such speculative loans seems low (measured by 
second and third mortgages). The deterioration of the construction and the real estate sectors 
increased the risk of loan defaults by these sectors. As most loans’ are backed by mortgages, 
banks’ capacity to extend them is reduced by declining asset prices.  
The high household indebtedness, recession, and predominance of variable rates in an 
environment of rapidly rising unemployment have already led to a rise in the stock of overdue 
household loans. The share of stock of overdue loans in the household loan portfolio more than 
doubled from mid-2007, and it reached 7% in September 2008. On the positive side, the banking 
sector is well-capitalized, with capital adequacy ratio well above the required minimum of 10%. 
Although banks have improved provisions as non-performing loans have risen, increases in 
lending rates and spreads have offset the impact on earnings (IMF, 2009).
29  
Debt sustainability concerns contributed to the abrupt end of the housing boom 
As discussed, by the end of 2007, Estonia had one of the highest private sector debts among 
the emerging market European countries. Around that time, the Nordic banks reassessed Estonia’s 
outlook including debt sustainability of households and the corporate sector. As a result, they 
tightened lending conditions, which triggered a sharp downturn in the housing loan market. In 
response to higher interest rates, households lowered their demand for credit, also because of 
concerns about declining real estate prices. As a result, growth of housing loans decelerated from 
74% in March 2006 (year-on-year) to 11% in December 2008. In addition, the credit crunch led to 
deceleration of real estate transactions, and contributed to collapse of growth (Figures 6a and 6b). 
By mid-2008, real estate prices were rapidly declining.
30  
                                                 
28.  There is no direct impact of unexpected interest rate increases on households holding fixed-rate loans. 
However, the households will ultimately bear the risk through their shareholdings in the financial 
institutions or – in case of securitized mortgages – through the value of pension funds (Debelle, 2004a). 
29.  As the currency board constrains the Bank of Estonia’s ability to provide liquidity support to banks, in 
February 2009 the Bank signed a precautionary agreement with the Swedish central bank. It allows the 
Bank to borrow up to 10 billion Swedish kronor against Estonian krooni, thus strengthening its capacity to 
extend liquidity. Nevertheless, the risks of financial contagion remain.  
30.  In the 4th quarter of 2008 prices declined by almost 30% relative to same quarter in 2007. Number of real 
estate transactions declined in the 1
st quarter of 2009 to less then 6,000 – the lowest level since 1997.   
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Figure 6a. Credit to households and number of real estate transactions 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Number of real estate transactions, index 2002Q4 = 100
Real credit to households, annual % change
 
. 
Figure 6b. Household debt, corporate debt and real GDP growth 
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Source: Statistics Estonia. 
The combination of plummeting real estate prices and transactions led to a decline in output 
and jobs in construction, finance and real estate services. The housing market adjustment took 
place mostly through decline in volumes rather than nominal prices, as is typical in other 
countries. The abrupt GDP fall in 2008 after the bust in the housing market that Estonia 
experienced is consistent with evidence from OECD countries that developments in the housing 
market can have a significant influence on the country’s business cycle (Leamer, 2007). 
According to OECD (2009d) and consensus forecasts, it also seems that Estonia’s experience will 
be consistent with the OECD countries’ evidence that housing crises are associated with long 
lasting recessions and considerable output loss, as discussed in the next section.  
What can past housing crises tell us about the Estonian recession? 
Based on 23 housing crises in 15 OECD countries between 1970 and 2002, Jannsen (2009) 
examined the effects of housing crises on the business cycle and found that housing crises usually    
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trigger a long lasting recession and a considerable loss in output.
31 In addition to growth of GDP, 
private consumption, residential investment, and business investment also dropped sharply at the 
beginning of a housing crisis and required more than four years to reach pre-crisis level.
32  
A comparison of this typical business cycle pattern during past housing crises with the 
current one in Estonia indicates that the decline in GDP growth there has been faster and deeper 
than in OECD countries during 1970-2002. As discussed previously, the recovery will be 
challenging because of the uncertainties surrounding the global economic and financial crisis. 
The boom-bust cycle of the years between 1984 and 1995 in Finland and Sweden can shed 
some light on Estonia’s current situation. The driving forces behind the boom-bust pattern in 
Finland and Sweden were financial deregulation combined with the maintenance of fixed 
exchange rate policies that contributed to: i)  overheating during the boom phase, with rising 
inflation and loss of competitiveness; and ii) the financial crisis during the bust phase, with falling 
output and rising unemployment. Financial developments - credit growth, asset prices and real 
after-tax lending rates  - were the key factors behind the cycle (Jonung et al., 2005).
33 Both 
countries experienced domestic banking and currency crises, which were eventually partly solved 
by devaluation.  
Jonung et al. (2005) found that the Finnish-Swedish experience was much more volatile than 
the average boom-bust pattern. The bust phase in particular was considerably deeper than the 
average boom-bust in OECD countries between 1970 and 2002, while the recovery came earlier 
and was more rapid.  
While Estonia shares some similarities with the Swedish and Finnish cases, there are also 
important differences that could ease the recovery. Just like in Finland and Sweden, the boom 
phase was driven by credit (and capital inflows), rising house prices, and low or even negative 
real after-tax lending rates. However, according to the recent Financial System Stability 
Assessment Update for Estonia, financial indicators point to a sound banking sector, and 
especially strong asset quality and earnings. The system has also proven its resilience during a run 
on one of the large foreign-owned banks in September 2008, which was promptly resolved due to 
policy actions of the home Nordic country’s central bank (IMF, 2009). At the same time, the 
global recession and the inability to utilize exchange rate flexibility are additional factors that 
could slow recovery in Estonia.  
With the global financial and economic crisis, euro adoption has again become a widely 
debated issue. For Estonia, the euro adoption also constitutes an appropriate exit strategy from the 
currency board, especially since the country already pays most of the cost of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) membership. Benefits of joining the EMU include: i) eliminating 
                                                 
31.  The start of a housing crisis is defined as the peak of houses prices within a rolling window of eight years, 
followed by a price decline from the peak of at least 7.5% during the next four years. Using this definition, 
the housing crisis in Estonia started in the 3rd quarter of 2007.  
32.  The author derived the median values of several macroeconomic variables within a time span from 
20 quarters before to 20 quarters after the start of a housing crisis. He found that annual GDP reached its 
bottom in the 2nd year after the price peak with an average growth rate of 0.1%. Accordingly IMF (2003), 
two years after the outbreak of a housing crisis, output was about 8% at below the level that could have 
been reached without a housing crisis. 
33.  Chapter 3, OECD (2009a) discusses the role that tax incentive for housing played in the accumulation of 
household debt and in the shift in the production and employment structure of the economy to construction 
and real estate.   
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exchange rate risks; ii)  borrowing ECB’s credibility in monetary policy; and iii) lowering 
transaction cost. However, meeting the 3% limit on the fiscal deficit in the context of falling 
output will be challenging and implies severe pro-cyclical cuts.  
V.    Improving functioning of the housing finance market 
This section examines to what extent the structure of the housing finance market has 
contributed to the risks discussed above and in particular to accumulation of high household debt 
predominantly at variable rates. It then discusses medium term policy options to mitigate some of 
these risks in the future.  
Characteristics of the housing finance market 
Institutional characteristics of mortgage markets reflect the local conditions of the financial 
sector and prevailing financial products, and thus vary widely across countries.  
The Estonian financial sector is dominated by foreign-owned commercial banks, with the 
four largest banks accounting for 97% of the housing loan market in 2007 (Tamm, 2007).
34 The 
housing loan market is characterized by variable-rate loans denominated in foreign currency, with 
high maximum LTV ratio and long maturity (Table 9). According to IMF (2004), countries with 
mostly adjustable-rate mortgages experience higher house price growth and volatility than 
countries with mostly fixed-rate mortgages. 
 
Table 9. Institutional characteristics of national mortgage markets 
   Fin. sector indicators  Mortgage products 
  
Maximum 
LTV (%) 
Typical 
maturity 
(years) 
Typical rate 
(fixed/variable) 
Equity 
withdrawal 
(Y/N) 
Restrictions on 
early payments 
(Y/N) 
Mortgage 
bond markets 
(Y/N) 
Estonia 95  20-30  variable Yes yes  no 
Czech 
Republic  70-100 20-25 fixed  no  yes  yes  (limited) 
Hungary 100  15  variable  yes  no  yes  (limited) 
Poland >100  20 variable 
yes, but 
rarely used 
fees allowed, 
but rarely used  yes (limited) 
Slovak 
Republic  70 15  variable 
yes, but 
rarely used  no yes  (limited) 
Latvia 100  20-40  variable  yes 
no explicit 
regulations  yes (limited) 
Lithuania 100  20-25  variable  yes  no  no 
Finland 75-80  15-20  variable yes 
creditor 
compensated  yes (limited) 
Sweden 60-80  <30 variable  yes  no  yes  (limited) 
Source: IMF (2008) and OECD (2005). 
                                                 
34.  This high degree of concentration exceeds that of most European emerging market countries, where 
70-80% of the housing market share is captured by 5 largest banks. It is comparable to Denmark and 
Sweden, where the 5 largest banks account for more than 90% of the housing market (IMF, 2007).    
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Reducing share of variable-rate loans through developing the housing finance market 
On the demand side of mortgage markets - borrowers usually opted for variable interest rate 
loans in foreign currency since they experienced mostly declining interest rates and steady 
exchange rate for years. They may have not fully realized the risks associated with these loans.
35  
More generally, the attractiveness of the different products for households depends partly on 
the costs of repaying a loan early or of re-financing. In Estonia, these costs are high - the law 
requires that the cost caused to the lender by early prepayment of the loan must be borne by the 
borrower (Tamm, 2007). In an environment with declining interest rates that prevailed in Estonia 
until mid-2005, myopic expectations, the high refinancing costs and limitations on early loan 
repayment encouraged households to opt for variable-rate instead of fixed-rate loans.  
The supply side of mortgage markets is a key factor behind the prevalence of adjustable rate 
mortgages. In contrast to most other European emerging market economies, Estonia has not 
developed mortgage bond markets. Banks have thus relied mostly on short-term deposits for 
financing long-term housing loans, supplemented by short-term loans from parent bank groups.  
Under such funding system, lenders tend to offer variable-rates mortgages to reduce their 
own interest risks, which they pass onto the customers. The banks therefore offer variable interest 
rates to mitigate their interest rate risk. The share of variable rate loans could thus be reduced by 
shifting to long-term capital market funding and narrowing the term gap between funding and 
lending. Such move would entail developing mortgage securities markets, in particular markets 
with covered bonds.  
Mortgage covered bonds are schemes in which bonds backed by mortgages pooled by lenders 
are sold to investors through a secondary market. Loan assets - and hence credit and prepayment 
risks - remain on the lender’s balance sheet, enhancing incentives for prudent assessment of such 
risks. The use of mortgage bonds in financing mortgage loans has two merits. One is that bond 
issues normally can raise longer-term funds than the collection of deposits, which are generally 
shorter-term in Estonia or than short-term foreign loans. This should help alleviate the duration 
mismatch between the assets and liabilities of the banks, improving their risk management. The 
other merit - once the markets stabilize - is the possibility of attracting more funds from foreign 
investors, and thus benefiting from the increasingly globalized financial markets (OECD, 2005; 
and European Central Bank, 2009).
36  
VI.   Conclusions 
The current recession notwithstanding, Estonia’s longer-term economic performance has 
been exceptional, with one of the highest growth rates in Europe and declining poverty. However, 
growth was unbalanced and collapsed in 2008. The boom-bust cycle was driven by massive 
capital inflows under the currency board, which fuelled credit and housing boom. The driving 
                                                 
35 The financial deepening was fast and the lending boom was characterized by unusually low interest rates, in 
particular for variable loans in foreign currency. As in other countries, households may have been looking at only 
initial monthly payments or assuming the interest rates will remain low. 
 
36.  Mortgage bond financing requires strong legal settings and a broad investor base. Moreover, development 
of the government bond market would provide useful benchmark.   
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factors of the credit boom were rapid income growth, increasingly negative real interest rates, and 
on the part both Nordic lenders and Estonian borrowers an overly optimistic assessment of the 
economic outlook. A tightening of lending conditions led to steep decline in construction and real 
estate related activities, which has spread to other sectors. These domestic factors were further 
exacerbated by the marked deterioration of the external environment due to the onset of the global 
economic and financial crisis, bringing Estonia into a deep recession. 
A key challenge for policymakers now is to restore high and sustainable growth, while 
reducing volatility. This will be challenging due to the existence of external and internal 
imbalances, and especially distortions that led to the excessive private sector indebtedness.  
To bring the economy back on track, Estonia will need to rebalance its resources from non-
tradables, and in particular construction and real estate, towards exports. Flexibility of the 
economy will thus be crucial, and so will be the gradual shift to an effective counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.
37 Over the medium term, policymakers could also strengthen incentives for a better 
functioning of the housing finance market by encouraging longer-term financing of mortgages. 
The aim of such measures is to reduce the financial stability risks associated with household debt, 
which in Estonia stem also from the almost exclusive use of variable interest rates and foreign-
currency loans. Furthermore, gradually removing the pro-cyclical bias of fiscal policy would help 
avoid exacerbating welfare reducing boom-bust cycles. 
                                                 
37.  For detailed recommendations in the fiscal policy area in Estonia, see OECD (2009a).    
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